

**IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE  
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS**

<b>In Re CSRBA</b>	)	<b>Subcase No. 91-7755</b>
<b>Case No. 49576</b>	)	<b>(353 consolidated subcases (see attached list))</b>
_____	)	<b>ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY</b>
	)	<b>JUDGMENT</b>
	)	
	)	

**I.**

**BACKGROUND**

1. On November 12, 2008, the Court entered an order commencing the Coeur d'Alene-Spokane River Basin Adjudication ("CSRBA").
2. The United States is a party to the CSRBA. On March 26, 2014, it filed 353 water right claims as trustee on behalf of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe ("Tribe"). The claims seek federal reserved water rights associated with the Coeur d'Alene Indian Reservation. Objections and responses to some or all claims were filed by various parties.
3. The Court consolidated the United States' claims into the above-captioned subcase on February 17, 2015. It also bifurcated the litigation in this matter between issues of entitlement and quantification, with the issue of entitlement to be addressed first.
4. *Motions for Summary Judgment* on the issue of entitlement were filed by the State of Idaho, the United States and the Tribe, Hecla Limited, and the North Idaho Water Rights Group.<sup>1</sup>
5. The following Objectors join in the State's *Motion*: Hecla Limited; Benewah County; City of St. Maries; City of Harrison; Buell Bros., Inc.; Jack Buell; Eleanor Buell; David

<sup>1</sup> The term "North Idaho Water Rights Group" refers collectively to the Objectors identified on Exhibit A attached hereto.

Corkill; Mary Corkill; Whiteman Lumber Co., Inc.; Alpine Meadows Water and Sewer District; North Kootenai Water & Sewer District; Potlatch Forest Holdings, Inc.; Potlatch Land & Lumber, LLC; Potlatch TRS Idaho, LLC; and the North Idaho Water Rights Group.

6. The following Objectors join in the North Idaho Water Rights Group's *Motion*: Benewah County; City of St. Maries; City of Harrison; Jack Buell; and Eleanor Buell.

7. Responses in opposition to the *Motion* filed by the United States and the Tribe were filed by the following Objectors: the State of Idaho; Hecla Limited; the North Idaho Water Rights Group; North Kootenai Water & Sewer District; Alpine Meadows Water and Sewer District; Potlatch Forest Holdings, Inc.; Potlatch Land & Lumber, LLC; Potlatch TRS Idaho, LLC; and John McFadden.

8. The following Objectors join in the State of Idaho's response: Benewah County; City of St. Maries; City of Harrison; Buell Bros., Inc.; Jack Buell; Eleanor Buell; David Corkill; Mary Corkill; Whiteman Lumber Co., Inc.; North Kootenai Water & Sewer District; Alpine Meadows Water and Sewer District; Potlatch Forest Holdings, Inc.; Potlatch Land & Lumber, LLC; Potlatch TRS Idaho, LLC; and the North Idaho Water Rights Group.

9. The following Objectors join in the Hecla Limited's response: Benewah County; City of St. Maries; City of Harrison; Buell Bros., Inc.; Jack Buell; Eleanor Buell; David Corkill; Mary Corkill; and Whiteman Lumber Co., Inc.

10. The following Objectors join in the North Idaho Water Rights Group's response: Benewah County; City of St. Maries; City of Harrison; Jack Buell; and Eleanor Buell.

11. Responses in opposition to the *Motion* filed by the State of Idaho were filed by the United States, the Tribe, and John McFadden.

12. Responses in opposition to the *Motions* filed by the North Idaho Water Rights Group and Hecla Limited were filed by the United States and the Tribe.

13. Reply briefs were subsequently filed by the United States, State of Idaho, Hecla Limited, and the North Idaho Water Rights Group.

14. The following Objectors join in the State of Idaho's reply: Benewah County; City of St. Maries; City of Harrison; Buell Bros., Inc.; Jack Buell; Eleanor Buell; David Corkill; Mary Corkill; Whiteman Lumber Co., Inc.; North Kootenai Water & Sewer District; Alpine Meadows Water and Sewer District; Potlatch Forest Holdings, Inc.; Potlatch Land & Lumber, LLC; Potlatch TRS Idaho, LLC; and the North Idaho Water Rights Group.

15. The following Objectors join in Hecla Limited's reply: Benewah County; City of St. Maries; City of Harrison; Buell Bros., Inc.; Jack Buell; Eleanor Buell; David Corkill; Mary Corkill; and Whiteman Lumber Co., Inc.

16. The following Objectors join in the North Idaho Water Rights Group's reply: Benewah County; City of St. Maries; City of Harrison; Jack Buell; and Eleanor Buell.

17. A hearing on the *Motions for Summary Judgment* was held on March 30, 2017, at the Kootenai County Courthouse in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho.

## II.

### STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56. The burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact is on the moving party. *Id.* When a court considers a motion for summary judgment, all facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party, and the court must draw all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. *G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co.*, 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991). However, when an action will be tried before the court without a jury, the trial court as the trier of fact is entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences based upon the undisputed evidence properly before it and grant summary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting inferences. *P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust*, 144 Idaho 233, 237, 159 P.3d 870, 874 (2007).

## III.

### ANALYSIS

The purpose of the entitlement phase of this litigation is to determine whether the United States, acting as trustee on behalf of the Tribe, is entitled to federal reserved water rights for use on the Coeur d'Alene Indian Reservation. Resolution of the issue of entitlement requires the Court to examine the documentation, circumstances, and history surrounding the creation of the reservation. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that when the United States reserved

land for use as the Coeur d'Alene Indian Reservation it impliedly reserved water rights for agriculture, fishing and hunting, and domestic purposes.

**A. History.**

The U.S. Supreme Court has had an opportunity to examine the history of the Coeur d'Alene Indian Reservation before. In *Idaho v. U.S.*, 533 U.S. 262 (2001), Justice Souter provided a detailed summary of the circumstances leading to its creation. This Court includes his summary herein, in pertinent part, to set the stage for the analysis that follows:

The Coeur d'Alene Tribe once inhabited more than 3.5 million acres in what is now northern Idaho and northeastern Washington, including the area of Lake Coeur d'Alene and the St. Joe River. Tribal members traditionally used the lake and its related waterways for food, fiber, transportation, recreation, and cultural activities. The Tribe depended on submerged lands for everything from water potatoes harvested from the lake to fish weirs and traps anchored in riverbeds and banks.

Under an 1846 treaty with Great Britain, the United States acquired title to the region of Lake Coeur d'Alene . . . . In 1867, in the face of immigration into the Tribe's aboriginal territory, President Johnson issued an Executive Order setting aside a reservation of comparatively modest size, although the Tribe was apparently unaware of this action until at least 1871, when it petitioned the Government to set aside a reservation . . . . The Tribe found the 1867 boundaries unsatisfactory, due in part to their failure to make adequate provision for fishing and other uses of important waterways. When the Tribe petitioned the Commissioner of Indian Affairs a second time, it insisted on a reservation that included key river valleys because "we are not as yet quite up to living on farming" and "for a while yet we need have some hunting and fishing." Following further negotiations, the Tribe in 1873 agreed to relinquish (for compensation) all claims to its aboriginal lands outside the bounds of a more substantial reservation that negotiators for the United States agreed to "set apart and secure" "for the exclusive use of the Coeur d'Alene Indians, and to protect . . . from settlement or occupancy by other persons." The reservation boundaries described in the agreement covered part of the St. Joe River (then called the St. Joseph), and all of Lake Coeur d'Alene except a sliver cut off by the northern boundary.

Although by its own terms the agreement was not binding without congressional approval, later in 1873 President Grant issued an Executive Order directing that the reservation specified in the agreement be "withdrawn from sale and set apart as a reservation for the Coeur d'Alene Indians." The 1873 Executive Order set the northern boundary of the reservation directly across Lake Coeur d'Alene, which, the District Court found, was contrary "to the usual practice of meandering

a survey line along the mean high water mark.” An 1883 Government survey fixed the reservation’s total area at 598,499.85 acres, which the District Court found necessarily “included submerged lands within the reservation boundaries.”

As of 1885, Congress had neither ratified the 1873 agreement nor compensated the Tribe. This inaction prompted the Tribe to petition the Government again, to “make with us a proper treaty of peace and friendship . . . by which your petitioners may be properly and fully compensated for such portion of their lands not now reserved to them; [and] that their present reserve may be confirmed to them.” In response, Congress authorized new negotiations to obtain the Tribe’s agreement to cede land outside the borders of the 1873 reservation. In 1887, the Tribe agreed to cede

“all right, title, and claim which they now have, or ever had, to all lands in said Territories [Washington, Idaho, and Montana] and elsewhere, except the portion of land within the boundaries of their present reservation in the Territory of Idaho, known as the Coeur d’Alene Reservation.”

The Government, in return, promised to compensate the Tribe, and agreed that

“[i]n consideration of the foregoing cession and agreements . . . the Coeur d’Alene Reservation shall be held forever as Indian land and as homes for the Coeur d’Alene Indians . . . and no part of said reservation shall ever be sold, occupied, open to white settlement, or otherwise disposed of without the consent of the Indians residing on said reservation.”

As before, the agreement was not binding on either party until ratified by Congress.

In January 1888, not having as yet ratified any agreement with the Tribe, the Senate expressed uncertainty about the extent of the Tribe’s reservation and adopted a resolution directing the Secretary of the Interior to “inform the Senate as to the extent of the present area and boundaries of the Coeur d’Alene Indian Reservation in the Territory of Idaho,” and specifically, “whether such area includes any portion, and if so, about how much of the navigable waters of Lake Coeur d’Alene, and of Coeur d’Alene and St. Joseph Rivers.” The Secretary responded in February 1888 with a report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, stating that “the reservation appears to embrace all the navigable waters of Lake Coeur d’Alene, except a very small fragment cut off by the north boundary of the reservation,” and that “[t]he St. Joseph River also flows through the reservation.” .

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Congress was not prepared to ratify the 1887 agreement, however, owing to a growing desire to obtain for the public not only any interest of the Tribe in land outside the 1873 reservation, but certain portions of the reservation itself. The

House Committee on Indian Affairs later recalled that the 1887 agreement was not promptly ratified for

“sundry reasons, among which was a desire on the part of the United States to acquire an additional area, to wit, a certain valuable portion of the reservation specially dedicated to the exclusive use of said Indians under an Executive order of 1873, and which portions of said lands, situate[d] on the northern end of said reservation, is valuable and necessary to the citizens of the United States for sundry reasons. It contains numerous, extensive, and valuable mineral ledges. It contains large bodies of valuable timber. . . . It contains a magnificent sheet of water, the Coeur d’Alene Lake. . . .”

But Congress did not simply alter the 1873 boundaries unilaterally. Instead, the Tribe was understood to be entitled beneficially to the reservation as then defined, and the 1889 Indian Appropriations Act included a provision directing the Secretary of the Interior “to negotiate with the Coeur d’Alene tribe of Indians,” and, specifically, to negotiate “for the purchase and release by said tribe of such portions of its reservation not agricultural and valuable chiefly for minerals and timber as such tribe shall consent to sell.” Later that year, the Tribe and Government negotiators reached a new agreement under which the Tribe would cede the northern portion of the reservation, including approximately two-thirds of Lake Coeur d’Alene, in exchange for \$500,000. The new boundary line, like the old one, ran across the lake, and General Simpson, a negotiator for the United States, reassured the Tribe that “you still have the St. Joseph River and the lower part of the lake.” And, again, the agreement was not to be binding on either party until both it and the 1887 agreement were ratified by Congress.

...  
On March 3, 1891, Congress “accepted, ratified, and confirmed” both the 1887 and 1889 agreements with the Tribe.

*Idaho*, 533 U.S. at 265-271 (internal citations omitted).

**B. When the United States reserved land for use as the Coeur d’Alene Indian Reservation, it impliedly reserved water rights for agriculture, fishing and hunting, and domestic purposes.**

Throughout the history of the Western United States the federal government has reserved lands from the public domain for a variety of federal purposes, including for use as Indian reservations. Many land reservations occurred during the West’s formative years. It was standard at the time for the federal government to expressly designate, whether by statute, treaty, or executive order, the lands it intended to retain. However, the issue of what corollary water rights, if any, were intended to be reserved was often neglected. This neglect led to the origin of the reserved rights doctrine.

The reserved rights doctrine was first applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Winters v. United States*, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). In 1888, the federal government reserved land along the Milk River in Montana for use as the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation. *Id.* at 575. The reservation was effectuated by treaty. *Id.* As was common at the time the treaty did not expressly reserve a water right. *Id.* Nevertheless, the Court found the federal government intended to reserve a water right to serve the purpose of the reservation. *Id.* at 576. It noted the policy of the government in reserving the land was to change the habits “of a nomadic and uncivilized people” to “a pastoral and civilized people.” *Id.* Further, that water was necessary to effectuate this policy as the reserved lands were arid and irrigation was required to sustain agriculture. *Id.* Given the purpose of the land reservation, the Court reasoned that the federal government intended to reserve a water right for irrigation and held that such a reserved water right was necessarily implied in the treaty. *Id.* The Court’s decision in *Winters* set the stage for what would become known as the reserved rights doctrine.<sup>2</sup>

The reserved rights doctrine is a doctrine built on implication. *U.S. v. New Mexico*, 438 U.S. 696, 715 (1978). It provides that “when the Federal Government withdraws its land from the public domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation.” *Cappaert v. U.S.*, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976). The doctrine’s scope is limited to the reservation of water for the primary purposes of a reservation:

Where water is necessary to fulfill the very purposes for which a federal reservation was created, it is reasonable to conclude, even in the face of Congress’ express deference to state water law in other areas, that the United States intended to reserve the necessary water. Where water is only valuable for a secondary use of the reservation, however, there arises the contrary inference that Congress intended, consistent with its other views, that the United States would acquire water in the same manner as any other public or private appropriator.

*New Mexico*, 438 U.S. at 702. A federal reserved water right may be implied only after the court “has carefully examined both the asserted water right and the specific purposes for which the land was reserved, and concluded that without the water the purposes of the reservation would be entirely defeated.” *Id.* at 700.

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<sup>2</sup> The doctrine is alternatively referred to in case law and literature as the “*Winter’s doctrine*,” “implied-reservation-of-water doctrine,” and the “federal reserved water rights doctrine.” For the purposes of this opinion, the Court refers to the doctrine as the “reserved rights doctrine” consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s identification of the doctrine in *U.S. v. New Mexico*, 438 U.S. 696, 715 (1978).

The United States filed 353 water right claims in the CSRBA acting as trustee for the Tribe. The claims seek federal reserved water rights associated with the Coeur d'Alene Indian Reservation for a variety of purposes. As a matter of law, the scope and nature of claims the United States may seek under the reserved rights doctrine is defined by the primary purposes of the reservation. The Court thus looks to the primary purposes of the reservation.

**i. Primary purposes of the Coeur d'Alene Indian Reservation.**

When President Grant reserved the land to be used for the Coeur d'Alene Indian Reservation he did not expressly identify the primary purposes of the reservation. His Executive Order simply provided that the reserved land is “withdrawn from sale and set apart as a reservation for the Coeur d'Alene Indians. . . .” *Strack Aff.*, Ex. 3. To ascertain the reservation’s primary purposes, the Court looks to the document and circumstances surrounding the creation of the reservation and the history of the Indians for whom it was created. *See e.g., Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton*, 647 F.2d 42, 47 (9th Cir. 1981). In so doing, the Court must construe any agreements between the United States and the Tribe “not according to the technical meaning of its words to learned lawyers, but in the sense in which they would naturally be understood by the Indians.” *Jones v. Meehan*, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899). Any such agreements must be liberally construed in the Tribe’s favor. *Cf., County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation*, 502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992) (“statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit”). However, agreements between the United States and the Tribe “cannot be re-written or expanded beyond their clear terms to remedy a claimed injustice or to achieve the asserted understanding of the parties.” *Choctaw Nations v. United States*, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943).

**a. Homeland theory.**

The positions of the parties regarding the primary purposes of the reservation differ. The United States and the Tribe advance a “homeland” primary purpose. That is, they assert the primary purpose of the reservation was to provide a permanent homeland for the Coeur d'Alene people and other Indians who reside thereon. They contend the following categories of water rights, among others, were reserved by the United States to serve the homeland purpose: domestic, commercial, municipal, industrial, instream flows for fish habitat, irrigated agriculture,



maintenance of lake levels in Lake Coeur d'Alene, water storage, power generation, aesthetics, recreation, religious, cultural, ceremonial, and maintenance of wetlands, springs, and seeps for game habitat and gathering activities.<sup>3</sup>

The Objectors assert the homeland theory is overly broad and contrary to law. This Court agrees. The reserved rights doctrine is a limited doctrine. It is meant to reserve water rights for some, but not all, uses associated with a federal reservation of land. Under the doctrine only the primary purposes of a federal land reservation may carry a federal reserved water right.<sup>4</sup> *New Mexico*, 438 U.S. at 702. Secondary purposes may not, and water rights for such uses must be pursued under state law. *Id.* The Court finds that the homeland theory advanced by the United States and the Tribe exceeds the doctrine's limitations and effectively eliminates the primary-secondary purposes distinction set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court.

A review of the United States' claims illustrates the point. The CSRBA is a general stream adjudication. Subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, water users within the adjudication boundaries are required to file claims for all existing water uses in the adjudication. I.C. §§ 42-1401A(5), 42-1409(4), and 42-1420. This requirement extends to the United States and the Tribe under the McCarren Amendment. 43 U.S.C. § 666. Presumably, the United States in exercising its fiduciary duty to the Tribe has filed claims in the CSRBA for all existing water uses associated with the reservation.<sup>5</sup> A review of the United States' claims reveals that they are all pursued under federal law as federal reserved water rights. Implicit in the claims then is the United States' assertion that every use of water associated with the Coeur d'Alene Indian Reservation dating back to its inception over 130 years ago has served the primary purpose of the reservation (i.e., serves the "homeland"). This is the shortcoming of the homeland theory. It

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<sup>3</sup> See e.g., *Notice of Claim* for water right claim 95-16704, which claims the following purposes of use associated with Lake Coeur d'Alene and its tributary sources, including surface water and groundwater: "[p]resent and future uses, including but not limited to: food; fiber; transportation; recreation; religious, cultural and ceremonial; fish and wildlife habitat; lake level and wetland maintenance; water storage; power generation; and aesthetics – as a component of a water right necessary to fulfill the homeland purpose of the Coeur d'Alene Reservation. . . ." See also e.g., *Notice of Claim* for water right claim 95-16708, which claims the following purposes of use associated with springs and/or seeps: "Wildlife and plant habitat for hunting and gathering rights as well as other tribal traditional, cultural, spiritual, ceremonial, and/or religious uses – as a component of a water right necessary to fulfill the homeland purpose of the Coeur d'Alene Reservation. . . ."

<sup>4</sup> Even then, a primary purpose may only carry a federal reserved water right if "without the water the purposes of the reservation would be entirely defeated." *New Mexico*, 438 U.S. at 700.

<sup>5</sup> Subject to certain exceptions not here applicable, the deadline for the filing of all water right claims based on either state or federal law has passed.

effectively eliminates the primary-secondary purposes distinction set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court by proposing that all water use associated with an Indian reservation serves the primary purpose of that reservation. In so proposing, the homeland theory fails to accommodate the notion of secondary purposes or, for that matter, the notion that the reserved rights doctrine is intended to reserve water rights for some, but not all, uses associated with a federal reservation of land.

Indeed, under the homeland theory advanced by the United States and the Tribe it is difficult to conceive a beneficial use of water that would not serve the expansive concept of “the homeland.” Any beneficial use of water, being beneficial by its very nature, benefits and serves the homeland. That is the position of the United States and Tribe. They concede no use of water in the history of the reservation that serves a secondary purpose of the reservation. If they did, they would have filed claims for such secondary uses in the CSRBA under state law. They did not file any such state law based claims, and the time for filing such claims has passed. Rather, they assert all uses of water associated with the reservation may be pursued as federal reserved water rights on the grounds they benefit the homeland. This Court disagrees and finds that the homeland theory offends the limited nature of the reserved rights doctrine by failing to place any functional limitations on the nature or scope of water rights that may be reserved under the doctrine.

Additionally, the Court notes that the U.S. Supreme Court has not applied the homeland theory advanced here. There is no doubt that the United States intended to move the Coeur d’Alene people onto the lands reserved to be the reservation with the aim that those lands be their homeland. However, this is true of all Indian reservations – their aim is to provide a homeland to those who inhabit them. Certainly the United States intended the lands reserved to be the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation to be the homeland of the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Tribes. Yet, the U.S. Supreme Court in *Winters* did not find a homeland primary purpose for that reservation. It held the reservation carried only a reserved water right for irrigation to serve the agrarian purpose of the reservation. Likewise, in *U.S. v. Arizona*, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Indian reservations at issue carried only reserved water rights for irrigation. *Arizona*, 373 U.S. at 600-601. The U.S. Supreme Court has never adopted or applied a homeland theory primary purpose and this Court declines to do so for the reasons

stated herein. The Court, therefore, finds the homeland theory advanced by the United States and the Tribe must be rejected as a matter of law.

**b. Agriculture.**

The parties are in agreement that one primary purpose of the reservation was to promote an agrarian lifestyle for its inhabitants. This Court agrees. The 1873 agreement entered into by the United States and the Tribe reveals an intent on behalf of the Tribe to pursue an agrarian lifestyle and an intent on behalf of the United States to encourage that pursuit. The agreement provided the Tribe would cede its claims to much of its aboriginal territory in exchange for a reservation and other consideration. In so ceding, the Tribe manifested an intent to move away from traditional lifestyle activities that required such an expanse of land in favor of an agrarian lifestyle more conducive to a reservation. The agreement contemplated that various implements would be conveyed from the United States to the Tribe to promote that agrarian lifestyle:

In consideration of the relinquishment of the title to all the lands described in article second of this agreement by said Indians, and in consideration of their removal within the reservation described in article first of this agreement, the government of the United States agrees as soon after the approval of this agreement as practicable, to furnish to said Indians at said reservation the following articles, to-wit:

10 wagons; 10 setts wagon harness; 50 sett plow harness; 50 ten inch plows; 10 Span [pair of matched working] American mares; 10 whip saws; 10 cross cut saws; 2 mowers with reapers combined; 1 sett blacksmith tools; 2 horse rakes; 20 harrows; 10 grain cradles.

Also to furnish material and construct on said reservation, for the use of said Indians 1 grist and saw mill combined; 1 School house with apartments for male and female pupils; 1 boarding and lodging house for pupils; 1 smith shop.

*Hart Aff.*, Ex. 2.<sup>6</sup>

Therefore, the Court concludes that one primary purpose of the reservation was to establish an agrarian lifestyle for its inhabitants. It follows that when the United States reserved land for use as the Coeur d'Alene Indian Reservation it impliedly reserved the water rights necessary to fulfill that purpose. There is some contention among the Objectors that agriculture

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<sup>6</sup> A transcribed type-written copy of the 1873 agreement may be located at pages 391-393 of E. Richard Hart's *A History of Coeur d'Alene Tribal Water Use: 1780-1915*, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 6 to the *Hart Affidavit*.

can be sustained to various degrees on the reservation without irrigation given local precipitation levels and climatic conditions. This contention raises issues regarding the amount of reserved water necessary to fulfill the agrarian purpose of the reservation. However, the State concedes that “such a determination will involve contested issues of fact not suitable for summary judgment, and may best be incorporated into the quantification phase of this litigation.” *State of Idaho’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment*, p.45.<sup>7</sup> Since the issue is one of quantification, the Court does not reach the Objectors’ contention here.

**c. Fishing and hunting.**

The Court finds another primary purpose of the reservation was to provide the Tribe with waterways for fishing and hunting. President Grant’s 1873 Executive Order followed a period of negotiation between the United States and the Tribe. Prior to 1873, President Johnson issued an Executive Order reserving lands for use as an Indian reservation for the Tribe. *Idaho*, 533 U.S. at 265. These lands were apparently reserved without the knowledge or consent of the Tribe. *Id.* at 266 (finding that the Tribe was “apparently unaware of this action until at least 1871”). When the Tribe learned of the Executive Order they found the lands reserved to be unsatisfactory. *Id.* Of primary concern was the fact they did not include important waterways such as Lake Coeur d’Alene or the Coeur d’Alene or St. Joe Rivers. *Id.*; *Hart Aff.*, Ex.6, pp.115 & 121-122. The Tribe petitioned the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for a reservation that included these waterways, thereby commencing a period of negotiation.

At the forefront of these negotiations was the Tribe’s need to access the waterways to facilitate its traditional fishing and hunting practices. Historically, Tribal village life focused on fishing and hunting near rivers and lakes. *Hart Aff.*, Ex.6, pp.6, 20-30. Naturally Tribal fishing practices were reliant upon important waterways such as Lake Coeur d’Alene and the Coeur d’Alene and St. Joe Rivers. *Id.* at pp.20-28. Tribal reliance on these waterways also extended to its hunting practices. *Id.* at 28-30. By the early 1870s, the Tribe had developed agriculture to a limited degree. *Id.* at 116. However, it continued to rely upon fishing and hunting practices for its survival. *Id.* at 122 & 138. During negotiations the Tribe made clear to the United States “we are not as yet quite up to living on farming” and “for a while yet we need . . . some hunting and fishing.” *Idaho*, 533 U.S. at 266; *Hart Aff.*, Ex.6, pp.118 & 122.

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<sup>7</sup> The Objectors join in the State’s *Motion for Summary Judgment*.

The intent of the Tribe to negotiate a reservation that included important waterways for fishing and hunting was known to the United States. *Hart Aff.*, Ex. 6, pp.144-146. So was the vigor with which the Tribe would defend its territory and important waterways if necessary. *Id.* at 137 &146. A report forwarded from a government appointed surveyor to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs provided that “[s]hould the fishing be excluded there will in my opinion be trouble with these Indians but should they be included . . . there will be no trouble.” *Hart Aff.*, Ex.6, p.127. It was the intent of the United States to avoid such trouble while at the same time extinguishing Tribal claims to much of its aboriginal territory so as to clear the way for non-Indian settlement. *Id.* at 146-150. The negotiations of the parties resulted in the 1873 agreement and corresponding Executive Order. Under the agreement, the Tribe agreed “to relinquish to the government of the United States all their right and title in and to” much of its aboriginal territory. *Hart Aff.*, Ex. 2. In exchange, the United States agreed, among other things, to “secure as a Reservation for the exclusive use of the Coeur d’Alene Indians” lands that included Lake Coeur d’Alene, the Coeur d’Alene River, and a stretch of the St. Joe River.<sup>8</sup> *Id.* That waterways were a significant aspect of the agreement is reflected in the concession that “the waters running into said reservation shall not be turned from their natural channel where they enter said reservation.” *Id.*

The history and circumstances surrounding the 1873 agreement and resulting Executive Order thus establish that one primary purpose of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation was to provide the Tribe with the important waterways needed to facilitate its traditional fishing and hunting practices. The very locale and construct of the reservation was tailored to serve this purpose, as the Tribe was not in a position to rely solely upon agricultural practices for its subsistence. The Court therefore concludes that when the United States reserved land for use as the Coeur d’Alene Indian Reservation, it impliedly reserved water rights necessary to fulfill the fishing and hunting purpose of the reservation.

#### **d. Domestic.**

The reservation of land for use as an Indian reservation carries the implied reservation of water rights necessary “to make the reservation livable.” *Arizona v. California*, 460 U.S. 605,

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<sup>8</sup> The Tribe subsequently ceded “the northern portion of the reservation, including approximately two-thirds of Lake Coeur d’Alene . . .” *Idaho*, 533 U.S. at 269-270.

616 (1983). This includes water rights for domestic use. In this case, the parties do not dispute the reservation carries federal reserved water rights for domestic use. However, concerns have been raised by the Objectors over whether the United States' domestic claims seek the right to develop water rights outside the boundaries of the reservation. At the hearing, counsel for the United States clarified that this is not the case. She represented that despite some ambiguity in the way the rights are claimed, the United States does not seek to develop points of diversion or places of use for domestic use outside the boundaries of the reservation.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, the Court finds that water rights for domestic use were impliedly reserved by the United States to serve the Coeur d'Alene Indian Reservation limited to points of diversion and places of use located within the reservation's boundaries.

Last, the Court notes that some courts have quantified domestic water use associated with an Indian reservation as encompassed within an agricultural reserved water right. *See e.g., In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System*, 753 P.2d 76, 99 (Wyo. 1988) (domestic use "has traditionally been subsumed in agricultural reserved rights"). The State asserts that the issue of whether that should be done here, or whether domestic use should be quantified independently, may best be addressed in the quantification phase of this litigation. The Court agrees and does not reach that issue here.

## **ii. Secondary purposes.**

The Court has identified the primary purposes of the Coeur d'Alene Indian Reservation as agricultural, fishing and hunting, and domestic. The United States claims water rights were reserved to serve many other categories of water use such as industrial, commercial, water storage, power generation, aesthetics, recreation, and maintenance of Lake Coeur d'Alene lake levels.<sup>10</sup> Limited support for certain of these uses may be found in the circumstances surrounding the creation of the reservation. For instance, Tribal requests for mills during the negotiations leading to the 1873 agreement may indicate the Tribe arguably had some concern with future commercial and/or industrial development. But these concerns were certainly

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<sup>9</sup> The ambiguity arises from the way the United States has claimed the place of use and point of diversion associated with its domestic use claims. Water right claim number 95-16672 for domestic use identifies the point of diversion as "Undetermined Current and Future Locations, 979 wells in Kootenai and Benewah Counties," and the place of use as "Undetermined Locations in Kootenai and Benewah Counties."

<sup>10</sup> This list is illustrative of other categories of water use claimed by the United States. It is not exhaustive.

secondary to the primary purposes of the reservation set forth above. With respect to other claimed uses, such as maintenance of Lake Coeur d'Alene lake levels, the Court finds no support. In any event, since the scope of claims the United States may pursue as federal reserved water rights is limited to those that serve the primary purposes of the reservation, the Court finds that its claims for purposes of uses other than agriculture, fishing and hunting, and domestic use must be disallowed as a matter of law.

**C. The United States is not entitled to federal reserved water rights outside the boundaries of the reservation.**

The United States claims a number of federal reserved water rights for instream flows outside of the boundaries of the reservation. The stated purpose of the claims is to provide fish habitat for fish species harvested within the reservation. The Objectors oppose the claims and assert they should be disallowed as a matter of law. This Court agrees.

An examination of the history surrounding the reservation provides no support for these claims. It was not a primary purpose of the reservation to protect off-reservation fish habitat. In the negotiations leading to the 1873 Executive Order, there is no discussion concerning off-reservation fish habitat or the need to preserve off-reservation instream flows. To the contrary, the 1873 agreement contemplated that “the waters running into said reservation shall not be turned from their natural channel *where they enter said reservation.*” *Hart Aff.*, Ex. 2. (emphasis added). There is no similar provision made for instream flows located outside of the reservation.

On the other hand, one of the purposes behind the creation of the reservation was to extinguish all off-reservation Tribal rights and interest. *See e.g., Idaho*, 533 U.S. at 275-276 (goals of the United States were “promoting settlement, avoiding hostilities and extinguishing aboriginal title”). This intent was manifest not only by the United States, but also by the Tribe which intended to give up its off-reservation rights and interests in exchange for a reservation “that created a strong wall around them” and “where they could continue to live as a cohesive tribe, without intrusions by Whites.” *Hart Aff.*, Ex.6, p.143. That the Tribe did relinquish its off-reservation rights and interests is reflected in the agreements between the United States and the Tribe.

For instance, the 1873 agreement contemplated that the Tribe would cede all rights and interests outside the reservation:

And the said Tribe of Coeur d'Alene Indians agree to relinquish to the government of the United States all their right and title in and to all of the lands heretofore claimed by them, and lying and being outside of said described Reservation . . . .

*Hart Aff.*, Ex. 2. Likewise, in 1887 the Tribe agreed to cede:

all right, title, and claim which they now have, or ever had, to all lands in said Territories [Washington, Idaho, and Montana] and elsewhere, except the portion of land within the boundaries of their present reservation in the Territory of Idaho, known as the Coeur d'Alene Reservation.

26 Stat. 989, 1027. Then, in 1889, the United States and the Tribe reached a new agreement under which the Tribe would cede the northern portion of the reservation, including approximately two-thirds of Lake Coeur d'Alene. Under that agreement, the Tribe agreed to “cede, grant, relinquish and quitclaim to the United States, all the right, title and claim which they now have, or ever had” to those ceded portions of the 1873 reservation. 26 Stat. at 1030.

The language of the agreements is plain, unambiguous, and absolute. It establishes that the Tribe gave up all its off-reservation rights and interests.<sup>11</sup> The Tribe did not expressly reserve any water rights beyond the boundaries of the reservation in the agreements. Nor did the United States impliedly reserve such water rights, as protection of off-reservation fish habitat and instream flows is not a primary purpose of the reservation. Therefore, the United States’ claims for federal reserved water rights for off-reservation instream flows must be disallowed as a matter of law.

The Court’s disallowal of these claims is consistent with case law. In Idaho, the Court previously rejected similar claims for off-reservation water rights filed by the United States in the Snake River Basin Adjudication on behalf of the Nez Perce Tribe. *Order on Motions for Summary Judgment*, Twin Falls Case No. 39576, SRBA Subcase No. 03-10022 (Nov. 10, 1999). Looking to other jurisdictions, the Court finds no support for the proposition that the United States can impliedly reserve water rights for instream flows located, as is the case here, many miles outside the boundaries of the lands reserved. To the contrary, the U.S. Supreme Court has directed that under the reserved rights doctrine the federal government “reserves *appurtenant* water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation.” *Cappaert*, 426 U.S. at 138 (emphasis added). Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has provided:

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<sup>11</sup> A water right is a real property interest under Idaho law. See e.g., *Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman*, 150 Idaho 790, 797, 252 P.3d 71, 78 (2011) (“[i]n Idaho, water rights are real property”).



Apart from the requirement that the primary purpose of the reservation must intend water use, the other main limitation of the reserved rights doctrine is that the unappropriated water must be “appurtenant” to the reservation. Appurtenance, however, simply limits the reserved right to those waters which are attached to the reservation.

*Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist.*, 849 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, in addition to a lack of historical evidence to support these off-reservation claims, the Court also finds the claims are not supported by case law.

#### **D. Priority Date.**

With respect to its claims for agriculture, the United States claims a priority date of November 8, 1873. That is the date of President Grant’s Executive Order. The State asserts that the earliest priority date possible for the claims is March 3, 1891. That is the date Congress accepted, ratified, and confirmed the 1887 and 1889 agreements with the Tribe. Under the reserved rights doctrine “the United States acquires a reserved right in unappropriated water which vests on the date of the reservation and is superior to the rights of future appropriators.” *Cappaert v. U.S.*, 426 U.S. at 138. It has been determined that the reservation of land creating the Coeur d’Alene Indian Reservation occurred on November 8, 1873. In *State v. Andrus*, 720 F.2d 1461, 1463 (9th Cir. 1983), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that “[t]he Coeur d’Alene Indian Reservation was established by Executive Order in 1873 . . . .”

Likewise, in *Idaho v. U.S.* the U.S. Supreme Court found the reservation of land occurred in 1873, holding that “Congress [in 1891] recognized the full extent of the Executive Order reservation lying within the stated boundaries it ultimately confirmed.” *Idaho*, 533 U.S. at 281. In so holding, the Supreme Court rejected arguments made by the State that the submerged lands at issue were not reserved by the United States prior to Idaho statehood for purposes of the equal footing doctrine. *Id.* The Court is bound by the Supreme Court’s decision in *Idaho v. U.S.* and, consistent with that decision, holds that the reservation of land creating the Coeur d’Alene Indian Reservation occurred on November 8, 1873. It follows that the United States is entitled to a priority date of November 8, 1873, for its agricultural claims as a matter of law.

With respect to its claims for fishing and hunting, the United States claims a priority date of time immemorial. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the issue, in

*U.S. v. Winans*, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905), it recognized that a treaty is “not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of right from them . . . .” Lower courts have applied this principle in finding a priority date of time immemorial for reserved water rights that accompany aboriginal practices. See e.g., *U.S. v. Adair*, 723 F.2d 1394, 1414 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that reserved water rights for hunting and fishing on the Klamath Reservation “carry a priority date of time immemorial”). In this case, one of the primary purposes of the Coeur d’Alene Indian Reservation was to allow the Tribe to maintain its traditional fishing and hunting practices. Therefore, the Court finds a time immemorial priority date to be appropriate for the United States’ claims for fishing and hunting.

With respect to its claims for domestic use, the United States claims a priority date of “[t]ime Immemorial, or in the alternative, November 8, 1873.” The Court finds November 8, 1873, to be appropriate as a matter of law. The United States’ claims for domestic use seek the right to divert groundwater via 979 current and future wells located throughout the reservation. While the use of surface water for domestic purposes was surely an aboriginal practice of the Tribe, the diversion and use of groundwater via wells was not. Therefore, it is not entitled to a priority date of time immemorial for its domestic use claims.

Last, the State argues the Tribe is not entitled to a date of reservation priority date for water rights associated with reservation lands homesteaded by non-Indians and later reacquired by the Tribe. The Court agrees. In 1906, lands comprising the Coeur d’Alene Indian Reservation were allotted to members of the Tribe.<sup>12</sup> 34 Stat. at 335. Reservation lands remaining after allotment were then opened to non-Indian homesteading. The Tribe has since reacquired some of these homestead lands. Under *U.S. v. Anderson*, 736 F.2d 1358, 1363 (9th Cir. 1984), an Indian tribe that reacquires reservation land homesteaded by a non-Indian is not entitled to a date of reservation priority date. Rather, it is entitled to the earlier priority date of either (1) the date the homesteader perfected a water right on the homesteaded lands under state law, or (2) if no water right was so perfected, then the reserved water right will carry a priority date as of the date of reacquisition. *Id.* The Court finds the holding in *Anderson* persuasive. The United States is therefore not entitled to an 1873 priority date for water rights associated with reservation lands homesteaded by non-Indians and later reacquired by the Tribe. The

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<sup>12</sup> The allotment occurred under the General Allotment Act of 1887, which provided that lands on Indian reservations could be granted to individual Indians in fee. 24 Stat. 388 (1887). Remaining reservation lands could then be made available for homesteading by non-Indians. *Id.*

appropriate priority date for water rights associated with such lands is the date the homesteader perfected a water right on the homesteaded lands under state law, or if no water right was so perfected, then the date of reacquisition.

**E. The United States' claim for lake level maintenance of Lake Coeur d'Alene is disallowed as a matter of law.**

The United States seeks a federal reserved water right for a sufficient flow of water into and out of Lake Coeur d'Alene to maintain lake levels at certain elevations. The Objectors protest this claim, and the Court finds it must be disallowed as a matter of law. Lake level maintenance was not a primary purpose of the reservation for reasons set forth above. Moreover, the outflow component of the claims seeks to develop a place or use outside the boundaries of the reservation.<sup>13</sup> The Court held above that the United States is not entitled to federal reserved water rights outside of the boundaries of the reservation as a matter of law. Therefore, the Court will disallow the United States' claim for lake level maintenance of Lake Coeur d'Alene.

**F. The Court does not reach the issue pertaining to the extent of submerged lands owned by the United States raised by the North Idaho Water Rights Group.**

The North Idaho Water Rights Group raises an issue in its *Motion* regarding the extent of submerged lands owned by the United States in trust for the Tribe. Counsel for the North Idaho Water Rights Group represents that the issue relates to the United States' lake level maintenance claim. The Court has determined that the United States is not entitled to a federal reserved water right for lake level maintenance as a matter of law. Therefore, the Court does not reach the issue.

**G. The Court does not reach the issue raised by Objector John McFaddin.**

Objector John McFaddin argues the United States, acting as trustee for the Tribe, cannot claim water rights associated with reservation lands allotted to individual Tribal members or to Indians that are not members of the Tribe. McFaddin admitted at the hearing that he is making this argument on behalf of other persons and entities, and that none of his own rights or interests

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<sup>13</sup> Specifically, the claim seeks the right to maintain certain monthly outflows as measured by the United States Geological Survey gage located on the Spokane River near Post Falls, Idaho. This location is outside the boundaries of the reservation.

are affected under the argument he advances. Objector McFaddin is not a licensed attorney. Under Idaho law, a non-lawyer can represent himself in a legal proceeding but he may not represent others without engaging in the unlawful practice of law. I.C. §§ 3-104 & 3-420. Accordingly, the Court does not entertain the arguments made by McFaddin on behalf of others.<sup>14</sup> Additionally, McFaddin does not support his argument with citation to any statute, case law, or other legal authority, and therefore the Court does not address it. *See e.g., State v. Orr*, 157 Idaho 206, 210, 335 P.3d 51, 55 (Ct.App.2014) (courts will not address arguments where a party “has provided no citation to authority to support [the] proposition”).


#### IV. ORDER

THEREFORE, BASED ON THE FOREGOING, THE FOLLOWING ARE HEREBY ORDERED:

1. The State of Idaho’s *Motion for Summary Judgment* is granted in part and denied in part consistent with this *Order*.
2. The United States’ and Tribe’s *Joint Motion for Summary Judgment* is granted in part and denied in part consistent with this *Order*.
3. The North Idaho Water Rights Group’s *Motion for Summary Judgment* is granted save the issue pertaining to the extent of submerged lands owned by the United States which the Court does not reach.
4. Hecla Limited’s *Motion for Summary Judgment* is granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 3, 2017

  
ERIC J. WILDMAN  
Presiding Judge  
Coeur d’Alene-Spokane River Basin Adjudication

<sup>14</sup> The Court notes that none of the persons or entities on behalf of which McFaddin argues have appeared in this proceeding despite having notice and opportunity to do so.

Subcase Nos:

91-07755	92-10921	93-07510	93-07560	93-07610	94-09251
91-07756	92-10922	93-07511	93-07561	93-07611	94-09252
91-07757	93-07462	93-07512	93-07562	93-07612	94-09253
91-07758	93-07463	93-07513	93-07563	93-07613	94-09254
91-07759	93-07464	93-07514	93-07564	93-07614	94-09255
91-07760	93-07465	93-07515	93-07565	93-07615	94-09256
91-07761	93-07466	93-07516	93-07566	93-07616	94-09257
91-07762	93-07467	93-07517	93-07567	93-07617	94-09258
91-07763	93-07468	93-07518	93-07568	93-07618	94-09259
91-07764	93-07469	93-07519	93-07569	93-07619	94-09260
91-07765	93-07470	93-07520	93-07570	93-07620	94-09261
91-07766	93-07471	93-07521	93-07571	93-07621	94-09262
91-07767	93-07472	93-07522	93-07572	93-07622	94-09263
91-07768	93-07473	93-07523	93-07573	93-07623	94-09264
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91-07770	93-07475	93-07525	93-07575	93-07625	94-09266
91-07771	93-07476	93-07526	93-07576	93-07626	94-09267
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91-07781	93-07486	93-07536	93-07586	93-07636	94-09277
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92-10919	93-07508	93-07558	93-07608	94-09249	95-16683
92-10920	93-07509	93-07559	93-07609	94-09250	95-16684

(Subcase list: CSRBATRIBE)

5/03/17

Subcase Nos:

95-16686	95-16740
95-16687	95-16741
95-16688	95-16742
95-16689	
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95-16737	
95-16738	
95-16739	

(Subcase list: CSRBATRIBE)  
5/03/17

## Exhibit A

Alan Littlejohn	Gale Briggs	Leland & Danielle Boldt	Roy & Linda Michael
Alfred Sichlinger	Gary Johnson	Leroy Bailey	Roy Mortensen
Andrew & Heather Scott	Gary Mitchell	Les Vawter	Russel & Marilyn Tanner
Annika Chatfield-Dietrick	Gary Weeks	Leslee Stanley	Russel Donohoe
Arliss Blalack	Gene L & Wesley L Warren	Linda & Dwayne Ryssman	Serena Lucas
Audrey Andersen	Gene Webb	Linda Alldredge	Sharon & Fred Smith
Barbara Harpole	Gianotti Trust DTD 1991	Linda Littlejohn	Sheila M Holm
Barney Layton	Gina Sutton	Linda Rider	Shirley Marsan
Barry & Pamela Meyers	Glennie & Elizabeth Renner	Lois Tuel	Shoshone County Commission
Ben Radford	Gordon Sanders	Margaret Sheridan	Shoshone County Public Works
Bernard & Dawn Weber	Greg Delavan	Mark P Kropf	Shoshone County Sportsmen's
Betty Hancock	Hagadone Hospitality Co	Marsha J Stewart	Stanley J Harrison
Beverly & Floyd Klein	Harmon Property Owners Assn	Martha Green	Stephen Matthews
Bill L Conner	Harry Grubham	Marvin & Maryanne Wheeler	Steve Addington
Black Bear Water Assn	Helen Jacquemin	Michael D Higbee	Steve Thomas
Blue Wolf Community Cub	Herman Fritz	Michael R Machler	Steven M Liss
Bonnie (Eleanor Y) Donohoe	Hisaya & Dorothy Takashina	Miguel Cabeza	Susan E Dredge
Bonnie Doose	J Rachael Johnson	Mike & Tina Kuhnline	Susan Rodgers
Bruce & Carol Maddux	Jack & Eleanor Buell	Mitchell, Gary & Patricia	Sutherland Family Revocable
Bruce Cyr	Jaida Levine	Mullan School District #392	Terry & Wilma Murray
Carl Blalack	Jakar Ventris LLC	Nancy Kleinkhecht	Terry Burger
Carl Cochrane	James & Molly Dolliver	Naomi Anderson	Terry Gilbreth
Carl W Anderson	James & Victoria Furth	Neil & Nancy Strom	Terry L Wall
Carla Woempner	Janet Briggs	Nona Bruns	Thomas F Dunnigan
Carol Clark	Jean Dohrman	Norman Carroll	Thomas G & Mary M Carver
Carol Felt Browning	Jed Rodgers	Norman McCall	Thomas M Patrick Revocable
Cheryl Prueher	Jeff & Dede Shippy	Pam Secord for Oceanwoods	Tim Day
Cindy Cooper	Jeff Funk	Patricele Hartel	Tim Shannon
Clyde H Sheppard	Jeff Tyler	Patricia & Kenneth Renner	Tom & Eilen Duhamel
Connie L Hasz	Jeremie Figueroa	Patricia Lozano	Tom Lucas
Crows Nest Water Association	Jodi Powell	Patricia Mitchell	Tony Zeller
Dale Herboldt	Joel & Cindy Newson	Patrick & Annette Petrie	Troy Francis
Daniel G Remmick	Johanna Renner	Paul & Colleen Smith	Verland Woempner
Darby G Donohoe	John & Agnes McFaddin	Paul Murray	Vic & Rita Brodie
Daren & Janet Labolle	John & Christine Thomas	Paul Segsworth	Vicki Carroll
Daren Labolle	John & Michelle McMahon	Peggy Timken	Vicki Hendrick & Sam Owen
Darla Noel-Wessel	John & Shirley Ferris	Perry Anderson	Warren Hall
David & Janet Weingart	John Boothe	Phillip Graves	Weber Farms
David & Jill Christiansen	John M Marsan	Phillip Levine	Wendy Jacquemin
David & Kathy McDaniel	John Neirinckx	Pinehurst Water District	Wesley & Linda Jordan
David "Brad" & Mary Corkill	John Neirinckx II	R Earl Andersen	William & Gretchen Harrison
David Sheridan	John R Kraack	Ralph & Martha Banderob	William & Nancy McAninch
Dean & Glenda Gentry	Jordon Redman	Ralph Kahn	William B & Gretchen Harrison
Dennis Backus	Joseph Rush	Randy Wilson	William K Hasz
Derald Moyer	Joyce D & Charles R Stock	Rasor Family Property	William White
Dianne Anderson	Joyce Morden	Rathdrum Power LLC	
Dick & Carole Harwood	Julie Day	Richard J Clemson	
Don & Martha Vail	Kathryn Kahn	Richard L Powell	
Don H Sherfey	Kathy Jordan	Rick & Holly Day	
Donald & Christine McCaw	Kaye A Mainsey	Rickey Dunn	
Donald Sutton	Keith Kleinkhecht	Robert & Dianna Bostrom	
Doris Miller	Kellogg School District	Robert & Gail Short	
Doug Luchini	Ken & Aileen Zaken	Robert & Julie Grunzweig	
Douglas & Darcy McInturff	Ken & Yvonne Devries	Robert & Norma White	
Dwayne Layton	Kent L & Donna J Davis	Robert & Patty Anderson	
East Shoshone County Water	Kevin & Shannon Simonsen	Robert Ellis	
Eddie A Bailey	Kevin & Tiffany Renner	Robert Powell	
Edmond & Janet Ferrel	Kevin Coleman	Robert Rider	
Edward & Candace Anderson	Kim Liss	Robin & Leslee Stanley	
Elizabeth Roberts	Kristi & Doug Payne	Robin Stanley	
Eric & Susan Skidmore	Lance & J Michele McDaniel	Roderick & Beth Halvorson	
Ernest & Myra Ecklund	Lance M Jordan	Ron Mendive	
Fernwood Water & Sewer Dist	Lance Stanley	Ron Wood	
Florence Farber	Larry & Susan Sotin	Ronald & Sherlene Mendive	
Frank Frutchey	Larry Donahoe	Rosie Layton	
Fred & Marcy Hasz	Larry Lehtola		

**CERTIFICATE OF MAILING**

I certify that a true and correct copy of the ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed on May 03, 2017, with sufficient first-class postage to the following:

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